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Following World War II, the United States accepted the responsibility of helping both the allies and axis powers regain economic and military stability in the name of global security. Throughout the Cold War, the United States stood as the most powerful balancing force to contain the influence of the Soviet Union -again with the purpose of maintaining global security. Emerging from the Cold War as the lone world super-power, the United States' role and responsibility ballooned as they entered the War on Terror.
As United States policy objectives grew, the ways and means required to secure those ends became unsustainable. This paper examines the environment the United States can expect to face in the twenty-first century, makes the case that force reduction is inevitable under the strain of the economic landscape, and proposes an approach to resolve the requirement for forward presence in a period of declining resources.
An Approach to Forward Presence in a Resource-Constrained Environment
At the end of World War II, the United States guided the western world through economic and military recovery. Beginning with the Marshal Plan from 1948 through 1951, the United States provided the conditions for European economic recovery. At times, this required the United States to accept great debt and to bear the brunt of the economic risk to ensure today's major European economic powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, and then West Germany, could regain a solid economic foundation. 1 While these states regained their economic composure, the United States provided military security. As the Soviet Union developed its nuclear capability beginning in 1949, the United States matured a presence in Europe. Additionally, the United States introduced a nuclear capability as early as 1954 to provide security and counterbalance Soviet nuclear capabilities.
2 As Soviet power continued to grow during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the United States provided the balance to keep the European region secure. 3 By the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States had developed a complex network of bases with runways and training areas to support large numbers of conventional, forward-based forces, designed to counter a Soviet invasion by tanks and aircraft. 4 On the other side of the globe, following the defeat of Japan, the United States established an occupation force in Japan and eventually a trusteeship in Okinawa until they, too, regained economic and military health. In the process, the United States protected the region from an expanding communist North Korea and China during the Korean War. United States presence continues in both Korea and Japan today at great cost to the United States. In all, the United States maintains 760 sites outside of the United States with several current expansion and relocation efforts underway. 6 However, Europe, Japan, and Korea achieved economic recovery long ago. The Cold War ended. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, Japan, and Korea maintain capable defense forces. With the world and United States economies in their current unstable state, can the United States afford to continue its robust, permanent forward presence, and, if so, should they?
A review and reduction of permanent overseas bases is particularly appropriate when the United States is simultaneously exploring force reductions. The 2010 National Security Strategy describes United States interests as security, prosperity, values, and international order. 7 The Secretary of Defense's Priorities for 21 st Century Defense describes the emerging twenty-first century security environment, and calls for robust forward United States presence and the ability to project power around the globe to protect those interests. 8 A problem emerges in strategy formulation during a period of declining resources. With fixed ends and declining means, the ways to achieve the ends may have to change. The status quo of a large overseas-based force does not appear sustainable due to costs, reduced force structure, and readiness. The combined benefit of reducing overseas facilities while reducing troop strength helps to eliminate concerns expressed by a congressional overseas basing commission over costs associated with returning forces to CONUS bases. 9 Further, the challenging fiscal environment provides a stimulus and opportunity to make wholesale adjustments to the entire military 3 apparatus. If done correctly, the United States will be positioned for continued relevance and influence in a period of significant change in the world's strategic environment. This paper will propose an approach to resolve the requirement for forward presence in a period of declining resources. To do this, the paper will examine the environment that the United States can expect to face in the twenty-first century.
Further, this paper makes the case that force reduction is inevitable under the strain of the economic landscape. The proposed approach to forward presence should help to balance a sustainable ends-ways-means strategic formula for national defense.
The Twenty-first Century Environment
In order to develop an approach to United States forward presence, one must first understand the strategic environment expected in the twenty-first century. The 2010
Joint Operating Environment includes the following four points that the United States should consider when posturing forces around the globe. 1. The world will experience a rapidly growing population of dissatisfied youth with few prospects for the future who are easily influenced by the promise of anything but poverty, disease, and pain. 2. Growing globalization and easy access to media will portray a significant division between the prosperous and the poor. 3. The means to reach and influence large populations will improve around the globe. 4. A rising China presents a potential, if not actual, change in the economic and political world leader. 10 A holistic view of the emerging environment
suggests that the United States should be prepared to rapidly respond to low to midintensity conflict over a wide expanse of the globe. Simultaneously, the United States should be prepared to deter and defend against a rising near-peer competitor in high intensity conflict. The United Nations' 2010 revision of the "World Population Prospects" also explains that the increasing world population will be moving quickly to urban areas. The urban population is expected to grow by seventy-two percent by 2050, from 3.6 billion to 6.3 billion. More concerning is that the rural population, the sustaining force for food and other resources, is only expected to grow slightly until 2021and then begin a decline through the remainder of the century, from 3.4 billion to just over 3 billion. 17 Simultaneously, the Central Intelligence Agency's "World Fact Book" reflects steadily climbing unemployment rates. The high-risk states referred to above have unemployment rates ranging from 12.2% to over 30% and growing. The population of those countries that fall below the poverty line is increasing rapidly and is above 45% for Sudan and Yemen. 18 Dramatic globalization with the widespread development of communication through the use of cell phones, social media, and news media provides easy access to huge portions of the population. We can expect this powerful resource to be exploited by ill-intentioned actors. Readily available media can be used to reveal the disparity in prosperity worldwide, generating hostility and instability.
To complicate the environment even further, we see a rising power in China. In an otherwise shaky world economy, theirs has grown from ninth in Gross Domestic 27 The combination of these most likely and most dangerous threats requires a United States force that is postured to respond quickly to crisis around the world while maintaining a sufficiently modernized force necessary to defeat a near-peer adversary.
The Fiscal Landscape and Force Reduction
While the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy unconstrained ends include global security with freedom of access to the global commons, one must consider the available means when developing the ways to those ends. 28 The world economy is presenting challenges to most of the developed countries of the world. The
United States has experienced more than a decade in which spending has far exceeded revenue. 29 In the United States, nearly all of the collected revenue can be expended on programs mandated by law, such as Social Security, Medicaid, Medicare, and interest on debt. 30 The Department of Defense spending falls within the portion of the budget that is negotiated annually between the President and Congress, known as 8 discretionary spending. Within our national discretionary spending, the Department of Defense budget makes up the largest slice. 31 Therefore, as lawmakers consider ways to reduce spending, they will surely look to the Department of Defense for the largest slice of savings. As the Secretary of Defense explores options for budget reductions, he has the unenviable challenge of balancing modernization, readiness, and capacity to ensure the military of the future is postured to meet the requirements of the National Security
Strategy.
According to the Department of Defense Comptroller, nearly a third of defense spending is designated for personnel and related programs. 32 Research and development and a portion of procurement dollars are being spent for modernization, totaling just over 18% of defense spending. Simultaneously, operations and maintenance and the remainder of procurement dollars being spent for readiness make up 47% of defense spending. 33 Therefore, the largest portion of military spending is used to maintain a ready capacity -personnel. Simply surrendering all modernization efforts would make a very small impact to the overall United States deficit spending. In order to find savings that the nation needs within the Department of Defense, reductions in all areas will be necessary.
The Department of Defense 2012 Defense Budget Priorities and Choices warns
that our military will likely face increased budget pressures. 34 Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta reminded an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace in June 2012 that in past defense drawdowns, which occurred after almost every major conflict, the threats facing the country, appeared to diminish. Unlike past post-conflict drawdowns, today we continue to have significant threats. Terrorism, weapons proliferation, cyber intrusion, and destabilizing behavior of nations like Iran and North Korea continue to threaten the interests of United States. 35 The 2011 National Military Strategy warns against becoming a hollow force with a large force structure lacking readiness, training, and modernization. 36 Further, the Secretary of Defense in his January 2012 updated priorities stated that this reduction in resources will "require innovative and creative solutions to maintain support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity;" with particular emphasis on "thoughtful choices required regarding the location and frequency of these operations". 37 As resources diminish, it becomes more important to precisely balance capacity, modernization, and readiness to preserve United States' national interests. In the past, the United States often assumed the primary role of defending others. We built permanent bases. We deployed large forces across the globe to fixed positions. We often assumed that others were not willing or capable of defending themselves. to an issue that arguably could have benefited from a more balanced application of "soft" and "hard" power. 49 The Center for a New American Security concluded that "The and finally, minimalist cooperative security locations which would likely be run by host nation personnel to be used by military forces in the event of a crisis to provide regional access. 60 The Department of Defense's plan for overseas reductions spanned the globe. A majority of the planned reductions were to occur in Europe. Nearly 200 facilities were identified for closure and 40,000 troops to be relocated. In Asia, the plan called for consolidating bases in Korea with a concurrent reduction of 12,400 forces while 7,000
Marines simultaneously relocated from Okinawa Japan to Guam. of strategic lift required to execute contingencies once forces were returned to the United States and an unaccounted for requirement for facilities to host returning forces.
As a result of the Commission's concern over these shortcomings, they recommended that the Department of Defense slow the pace of overseas re-basing. 62 A current effort that may appear to run contrary to an overseas base reduction effort is the ongoing reduction of United States airlift fleets. The Department of Defense is retiring twenty-seven heavy lift aircraft, sixty-five medium lift C-130s, and all thirtyeight C-27s. 63 At face value, this may appear to lend credibility to the 2005 Overseas Basing Commission finding that noted mobility and material pre-positioning were key to the success of re-basing strategy and further expressed concern that current and projected strategic airlift and sealift were inadequate to support the Department of Defense concept. 64 However, the Department of Defense is making these thoughtful reductions in concert with the adjusted capacity requirement. 70 Forward presence displays a capability and readiness to potential threats, expresses national resolve, and seeks to convince adversaries that the price to pay for aggression will be too costly.
From a Homeland Defense perspective, United States military forces must be trained, ready, and postured to intercept potential enemies, eliminate enemy sanctuaries, and maintain regional stability, in conjunction with allies and friendly states. 71 Overseas basing provides a continuous presence in the approaches to our homeland to detect and identify potential threats in time to deter or defeat them. Forces stationed in our forward regions provide maximum awareness of threats, and maintain freedom of action to protect the nation at a safe distance.
Recommended Forward Presence Priorities
According to the Secretary of Defense, the twenty-first century environment coupled with the emerging fiscal reality led the United States to reshape priorities in a new defense strategy. 72 The most recently revised priorities for twenty-first century 19 defense indicate that the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas where our access and freedom to operate are challenged. 73 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically identified the maritime domain as enabling the bulk of the joint force's forward deployment and sustainment, as well as the commerce that underpins the global economic system. 74 The National Military Strategy recognizes that forward presence and engagement will take on greater importance during this time. 75 But at the same time, warns that forward presence must be established at a sustainable pace to include rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. As an example, as the Marine Corps withdraws from Afghanistan, it will return to an afloat posture with the capability to rapidly respond to crises as they emerge. 76 The Secretary of Defense maintains that the military must have the capacity to confront aggression and defeat more than one enemy at a time. 77 It is widely accepted that the United States military will become smaller and leaner, but must remain agile, flexible, and quickly deployable. The challenge will be to balance that capacity and readiness with the requirement for cutting edge technology. The latest Department of Defense budget guidance suggests that the United States military step away from permanently forward based forces that develop only bilateral relationships with the host nation. Instead, the focus should be on a security cooperation force focused on becoming the security partner of choice with a growing number of nations around the globe. 78 The Department of Defense's Priorities for the 21 st Century Defense prioritizes the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining appropriate focus on the Middle East. 79 As we 20 move in that direction, the focus must be on helping more nations share the responsibilities and costs of providing security by investing in alliances and partnerships. In many cases, it may be appropriate to shift from permanently forwardbased forces to innovative rotational deployments to engage in exercises, training, and assistance to build new alliances and partners. In June 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained that our new strategy recognizes that we no longer live in a world where other nations are unwilling or unable to defend themselves and calls for adjustments across the entire national security enterprise. 80 The Center for a New American Security's capstone summary, "Contested
Commons," identified that the United States is facing an increasing reluctance from many host nations to support large military bases. Maintaining the ability to project power world-wide requires the use of forward bases in key regions, which is costly. 81 The dilemma that the United States faces is how to maintain a persistent power projection capability without fomenting resentment by host nations and their neighbors in the region. A partial answer lies in a shift to expeditionary, sea-based forces.
However, even the most advanced expeditionary naval platforms require regional logistics bases for sustained operations.
The Secretary of Defense explained that to move away from a large network of overseas bases, the United States must optimize the selection of innovative, smallfootprint deployments of United States forces and capabilities to key strategic locations around the globe. 82 The Congressional Research Service report on U.S. Military
Overseas Basing noted that redistributed forces must be located where they are closer to, and better able to respond to, potential trouble spots. 83 The transition from today's 21 lay down to a reduced overseas footprint must be deliberately slow and methodical to prevent the perception, by our partners, of simply packing-up and leaving. The
Secretary of Defense identified that the United States military must develop a partnering culture. 84 Development of improved language skills, cultural training, and an improved and collaborative working relationship with the Department of State and USAID will enable a smooth transition that will seek to prevent our partners from feeling abandoned. Further, the United States must develop close relationships with the host nations of those remaining permanent bases to reduce the risk of limits of use that have arisen in the past. 85 As the United States attempts to refine basing locations, we should keep in mind that United States presence means different things to different actors.
Alexander Cooley's book, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military
Overseas, explains that to some, United States presence means a guarantee of security, while others may see it as a political endorsement of that state's ruling power.
Our presence could also be viewed as an economic opportunity or a violation on national sovereignty. 86 As the United States adjusts the ways to achieve our national objectives with declining means, five key factors should be considered. First, forward presence remains essential to maintaining global security. Second, use of the maritime domain provides flexibility in projecting power; especially as we shift toward the Pacific. Third, our adjusted approach to national defense must demonstrate a commitment to our security partners while simultaneously recognizing a growing reluctance by partner nations to host large United States bases. Fourth, as the relative power of many of our partners grows, we must ensure that they share the responsibility and cost of their 
Limit Permanent Overseas Presence to Strategic Locations
Even a predominately naval force requires forward permanent bases for logistical support. In normal peacetime operations, these bases are required for resupply and maintenance. In a contingency, forward bases will be required to re-arm and re-fit.
Access to port facilities, capable of loading and offloading both commercial and tactical shipping, and airfields capable of supporting strategic airlift, will be essential for American power projection. However, the size of the bases during peacetime operations, to include the number of permanent personnel based at these locations, should be minimized to reduce overhead costs. Further a reduced presence may minimize resentment by host nation citizens and neighboring states generated by the presence of a foreign force. The force must be light enough to be sustainable, but also large enough to support rotational deployments for exercises and contingency operations. locations coupled with assured access through strong partnership will preserve the United States' ability to project power when necessary.
Build Flexibility in Basing Strategy
The maintenance of large infrastructure on overseas bases drives high costs and limits flexibility in adjusting the overseas basing strategy. Aboard the 760 sites maintained outside of the United States, the United States pays to use over 54,000
buildings. 94 In order to build flexibility into the basing strategy, the United States should seek to consolidate bases where possible and minimize the infrastructure. In some cases, legitimate missions exist to require a large permanent contingent. In other cases, a much smaller permanent personnel force could sustain the infrastructure and support rotational forces or transitional forces responding to a regional crisis.
Conclusion
As far back as fifty years ago, Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State under President Truman, called for a revitalized military strategy where the European allies accepted increased responsibility for their own defense by building their conventional military forces to be complemented by a strong United States force posture and nuclear deterrent. 95 This idea, of accepting a fair-share while capitalizing on unique capabilities of various partners for global security, still appears to be a logical solution today.
As the United States turns its fiscal challenges into a stimulating opportunity, the United States military should focus on sea power as a strategic maneuver enabler. This focus will provide flexibility and responsiveness and serves as a vehicle for wide-spread security cooperation and facilitates building partner capacity. Even with this naval expeditionary focus, there will be a continued requirement to maintain key strategic permanent forward bases to provide logistical support to naval and aviation forces. The locations of these forward bases should provide flexibility within reach of failed or failing states that can influence key global commons or regional stability.
As the United States consolidates and reduces overseas bases, diplomatic and military efforts should ensure that those who can afford to protect themselves do so.
Responsibility to protect a region or unrestricted access to the commons should not, by default, fall to the United States in otherwise prosperous areas. It is imperative that the United States signal clearly that world security is a team effort. This is especially true in Europe.
Finally, as the United States adjusts its overseas basing structure, the United
States military must be sure to build in flexibility to adjust to a changing security environment. Future reduction of overseas bases should not cost more to forfeit than they would to maintain. United States' overseas bases should maintain less infrastructure and fewer forces. The United States' commitment to provide regional forces to fight on short notice from overseas bases should be reserved only for the most critical threats to national interests in areas where host nations are unable to defend themselves.
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